Abstract. In this paper, a model of political consensus is introduced. Parties try to reach consensus in forming a government. A government is defined as a pair consisting of a winning coalition and a policy supported by this coalition, where a policy consists of policies on given issues. A party evaluates all governments the party belongs to with respect to some criteria. We allow the criteria to be of unequal importance to a party. These criteria concern winning coalitions and policy issues. Parties may be advised to adjust their preferences, i.e., to change their evaluation concerning some government(s) or/and the importance of the criteria, in order to obtain a better political consensus.
Introduction
In the literature, one may find many works on coalition formation theory; see, for instance, Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), Axelrod (1970) , Baron (1993) , De Swaan (1973), De Vries (1999), Grofman (1982) , Kahan and Rapoport (1984) , Kirchsteiger and Puppe (1997) , Laver and Schofield (1990) , Shepsle (1990, 1996) , McKelvey, Ordeshook and Winer (1978) , Peleg (1981) , Schofield (1993a Schofield ( , 1993b Schofield ( , 1995 , Shepsle (1979) , Van Deemen (1991 , 1997 ). An alternative model of multi-dimensional coalition formation has recently been presented in Rusinowska et al. (2005) . The central notion of this model is the notion of a stable government, where a government is defined as a pair consisting of a winning coalition and a policy supported by this coalition. A policy is a tuple of policies on given issues. In Rusinowska et al. (2005) , necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a stable government are investigated. In this coalition formation model parties are supposed to have preferences regarding each winning coalition and regarding each policy on the given issues. These preferences are supposed to be constant and no possibility of adjusting the preferences of a party is considered.
A consensus model is analyzed in Carlsson et al. (1992) , where the authors study the problem of formalizing consensus, within a set of decision makers trying to agree on a mutual decision. Convergence to consensus depends on the decision makers' willingness to compromise. Contrary to the model proposed in Rusinowska et al. (2005) , in Carlsson et al. (1992) , decision makers are often advised to adjust their preferences in order to obtain a better consensus.
The aim of this paper is to introduce a dynamic model of coalition formation in which parties may compromise in order to reach consensus. By combining some notions of both the consensus model (Carlsson et al. (1992) ) and the model of a stable government (Rusinowska et al. (2005) ), a new consensus model of political decision-making is constructed.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a model of coalition formation, and a procedure for consensus reaching within a coalition is presented. Each coalition 'entitled' to form a government tries to reach consensus on a government policy. We also discuss the stability property. In Section 3, we consider a procedure for choosing a feasible government from among all governments proposed by the coalitions. In Section 4, we conclude. The paper contains two appendices. In Appendix A, we present some procedures different from the one proposed in Section 3. Appendix B presents an example illustrating the notions of our model of political consensus.
2 Consensus reaching within a coalition
Preliminaries
Let N be the set of all parties in parliament, where N = {1, ..., n}. Let W denote the set of all winning coalitions, that is,
where w i is the number of seats received by party i, and q is the quota, i.e., the number of seats needed for a coalition to be a winning coalition. We assume that the winning coalitions are 'entitled' to form a government. An important property of a winning coalition is the acceptability. We assume that each party i ∈ N either accepts or does not accept a winning coalition it belongs to. Let W i be the set of all winning coalitions containing party i ∈ N that are acceptable to party i.
The model concerns the creation of a government. It is assumed that there are some independent policy issues on which a government has to decide. Let P be the set of all policies. A policy is said to be acceptable to party i ∈ N if it is acceptable to this party with respect to each issue. Let P i denote the set of all policies acceptable to party i ∈ N .
A government is defined as a pair g = (S, p), where S is a winning coalition and p is a policy. Let G denote the set of all governments. We then have
Next, the notion of feasible government is introduced. A government (S, p) is feasible if both S and p are acceptable to each party belonging to S. Hence, the set G * of all feasible governments is equal to
In this model, only feasible governments are considered. We introduce the set of all feasible coalitions as
Let G * i be the set of all feasible governments containing party i, that is, for
Of course, it may happen that G *
A feasible government is evaluated by each member of this government with respect to the given policy issues and with respect to the issue concerning the coalition. Let X be the finite set of criteria. First of all, each decision maker evaluates the importance of the criteria. It may happen that one criterion, for instance, the winning coalition, is more important to a party than another one, i.e., than a certain policy issue. This means that it is more important to a given party which parties will form the government than which policy will be supported by this government. For each i ∈ DM , we assume with the set of all policies acceptable to all parties from S. Reaching consensus within a coalition means that the preferences of the parties from this coalition, as well as their evaluation of the importance of all criteria from X, should be relatively close to each other. When parties from a coalition reach consensus on a government involving this coalition, they may be confronted with governments formed by other coalitions, in which case the evaluation of the criterion 'winning coalition' may be quite important.
Given a feasible coalition S ∈ W * , each party i ∈ S evaluates each government from G * S with respect to all the criteria. Hence, for each i ∈ S, we assume
The value f i,S (x, y) is the value of government y ∈ G * S to party i ∈ DM with respect to criterion x ∈ X. Again, in practice, given party i and criterion x the values of f i,S (x, y) for the different governments y ∈ G * S can be determined realistically by the MACBETH software.
Moreover, for each i ∈ S, we define
where ( (7) and (9),
Consensus degree
Let LG * S denote the set of all mappings
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) the consensus degree between decision makers i and j in coalition S. We may define d(β i,S , β j,S ) by a Euclidean-like 'distance' between the corresponding vectors. The higher the consensus (degree), the smaller the 'distance' between pairs of decision makers, i.e., between β i,S and β j,S . In particular, if d(β i,S , β j,S ) = 0 (i.e., δ(β i,S , β j,S ) = 1), then we say that i and j are in complete consensus in coalition S. If d(β i,S , β j,S ) = 1 (i.e., δ(β i,S , β j,S ) = 0), then we say that i and j are in complete disagreement in coalition S. Let i, j ∈ S. We propose the Euclidean-like 'distance' given by
where |G * S | denotes the number of alternative governments for coalition S. Next, we define
and a generalized consensus degree for coalition S as
The generalized consensus degree δ * S concerns the consensus reached by all the decision makers from coalition S.
Consensus reaching
In this sub-section we specify a procedure for consensus reaching within a coalition. If parties are sufficiently willing to compromise, the procedure will result in reaching consensus, and in proposing one feasible government formed by the given coalition. A certain consensus degree 0 < δ < 1 is required in the model. We say that coalition S reaches consensus if the generalized consensus degree δ * S is not smaller than δ, that is, if δ * S ≥ δ. If δ * S < δ, then the parties do not reach consensus, of course, if (some of) these parties do not adjust their preferences.
Note that, in particular, if G * S = {y}, then for each i ∈ S, and for each x ∈ X, f i,S (x, y) = 1, and hence, for each i ∈ S, β i,S (y) = 1. So, in this case, δ * S = 1. This means that if there is only one alternative to a given coalition S, this coalition will reach (complete) consensus.
Let D * S be the set of parties from S with most different preferences, that is,
For each feasible coalition, we assume a kind of mediator, called the chairman.
The chairman does not belong to any party and he is indifferent between all the parties. The chairman will decide which party from D * S will be advised to change its preferences (i.e., evaluations) regarding some government(s) or/and halshs-00283200, version 1 -22 Jul 2009 the importance of the criteria. It seems reasonable to assume that a party asked to adjust its preferences is a party i
If there are at least two such parties, the chairman chooses one of them. Moreover, the chairman proposes such a change to party i D S that the consensus degree will increase if this party follows the chairman's advice. If possible, the chairman's advice should lead to a new consensus degree not smaller than δ. If the party does not agree to adjust its preferences (evaluations) according to the chairman's advice, the chairman may propose another change to the same party or a change to another party. If consensus is reached for a given coalition S, that is, if the generalized (final) consensus degree is not smaller than δ, a consensus decision for coalition S is determined as follows. We add up the weighted (final) values of the alternatives to all decision makers from S. For each y ∈ G * S , the weighted value β S (y) of alternative y to coalition S is defined as
where
For calculating the β S 's we decided for the weighted sum, but we could also treat all the parties equally, and define β S (y) for each y ∈ G * S as β S (y) = i∈S β i,S (y). Coalition S chooses the government y * S such that
If there are two such governments, the chairman chooses one of them. Generally, if in the chairman's opinion it does not make any sense to continue the attempts to reach consensus within the coalition S, the decision making about forming a government by S is postponed, and the given coalition is involved in no government. This means that the given coalition does not propose any government to be formed.
Stability
Let Y be a set of alternatives, and let DM be the set of decision makers involved in them. We assume that for each i ∈ DM , there is a function
In practice, the values of the β i (y)'s for the different y ∈ Y can be determined realistically by the MACBETH decision support system.
We say that alternative
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Choosing a government
Each feasible coalition S ∈ W * in which the parties reach consensus, proposes the government y * S agreed upon. If there is only one feasible government proposed, i.e., if only one coalition managed to reach consensus, this government is chosen, and finally formed. If there is no feasible government proposed, of course, no government is formed.
Suppose that at least two feasible governments are proposed, which means that at least two coalitions succeeded in reaching consensus. Let Y * be the set of all the governments resulting from consensus reached by feasible coalitions, where 1 < |Y * | ≤ |W * |. Let DM * be the set of all the parties involved in at least one consensus government, i.e.,
Let Y * i denote the set of all governments from Y * containing party i ∈ DM * , i.e., for each i ∈ DM * 
Again, one may use the MACBETH software in order to determine the values of f i (x, y) for the different y ∈ Y * i , given party i and criterion x.
In order to avoid some 'dominated' solutions, we add a condition expressing a kind of 'internal stability'. Since we do not restrict feasible coalitions to minimal winning coalitions, it may happen that there are two coalitions from W * such that one of them contains the other. Let us consider the following condition.
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We say that a government y
Condition (26) says that there is no subset S of coalition S * , and S * is a subset of no coalition S that can form its own government y = (S, p) 
Let W * * be the set of all the feasible coalitions forming an internally stable government, i.e.,
and let DM * * denote the set of all decision makers involved in at least one internally stable government, i.e.,
In order to choose a government from Y * * in case |Y * * | > 1, we propose a procedure in which the coalition with the highest consensus is awarded, and is asked to form a government. The government chosen is
satisfying the following condition
Suppose that there are at least two solutions of this condition. We may then choose the coalition in which two players are most 'close' to each other, or, alternatively, the coalition with the minimal average distance. Let for each S ∈ W * * c *
Moreover, let W * * (0) denote the set of all the solutions of condition (31). Then, the government chosen by this procedure is a government
satisfying the extra condition
In the unlikely case that there are at least two solutions of condition (33), one may apply other procedures. We discuss some of them in Appendix A.
Conclusions
In this paper, a consensus model for coalition formation has been proposed. If parties are willing to compromise, it is always possible to reach consensus, and to create a feasible government. In the procedure there is an 'outsider', called the chairman, who advises parties how to adjust their preferences. Clearly, the consensus agreed upon depends on the suggestions of the chairman. First, each feasible coalition tries to reach consensus within this coalition about the government to be formed. Parties consider only feasible governments, i.e., governments acceptable for all parties belonging to the coalition involved, and if there is only one feasible government they can form, they agree. If the parties from a given coalition manage to reach consensus, the coalition proposes to form the government agreed upon. This consensus government is stable in the given coalition with respect to the set of all feasible governments formed by that coalition. It may happen, of course, that no feasible coalition reaches consensus. In this case, no final government is created. If there is only one feasible coalition which reaches consensus, then the government proposed by this coalition is formed. If there are at least two coalitions that succeed in reaching consensus, that is, if at least two governments are proposed, we select the governments which are 'internally stable'. Next, if there are at least two such governments, an extra procedure is applied in order to choose one of these governments. Essentially, we propose one such procedure, but some alternative procedures for choosing a government are considered in the appendix.
The model presented in this paper may be extended by incorporating portfolio distribution issues into the model. Since a portfolio distribution depends on a governing coalition, it seems proper to treat 'portfolio distribution' as an additional issue dependent on 'winning coalition'. Hence, instead of considering (winning) coalitions only, one may analyze an independent issue consisting of two dependent sub-issues: 'winning coalition' and 'portfolio distribution'.
The consensus model can also be applied to choosing an alternative from a set of alternatives by a committee.
The protocol given in this paper can be automatized, resulting in a decision support system for coalition-government formation. The informational requirements of the proposed protocol are demanding, but the MACBETH software can deliver all information needed in a very rational and perspicuous way; see Roubens et al. (2006) . that each party i ∈ DM * * has an evaluation of each government from the set Y * * with respect to all the criteria from X, whether the party belongs to this government or not. Hence, for each i ∈ DM * * , we assume
and define
Again, one may use the MacBeth software to determine the values of F i (x, y). The government chosen by using this procedure is a government y (3) = (S (3) , p (3) ) ∈ Y * * satisfying the following condition
where for each i ∈ DM * *
If there is more than one government satisfying this condition, some extra method(s) may be applied. Suppose that, for instance, there are two governments satisfying this condition, but the majority of the decision makers prefers one of them. Then, this government preferred by the majority may be chosen. Condition (37) says that the government y (3) maximizes the weighted sum of the values B i (y) of all decision makers i from DM * * . Of course, this does not mean that the government is the best for the parties forming this government. This chosen government may be, for instance, more popular among the parties not belonging to this government, but less advantageous to its members.
Appendix B: Example
In order to illustrate the main procedure for consensus reaching (described in Section 2 and Section 3), let us analyze the following simple example. We consider a parliament consisting of five parties,
with the quota q = 51, and the following weights of the parties:
Hence, there are 15 winning coalitions, but not all these coalitions are acceptable to their members. Neither party A nor B does accept any coalition with E. Party E in its turn does not accept any coalition either with A or with B. Moreover, party C does not accept any coalition with D, and D does not accept any coalition with C (see [16] on the willingness to cooperate). Hence, we have only two winning coalitions acceptable to all their members, that is, coalition ABC and ABD. Using the notation from Section 2, we have
Moreover, suppose there are four policies, i.e.,
with respect to two policy issues x 1 and x 2 . Hence, the set of all criteria is equal to
where criterion x 3 concerns the winning coalition. Assume that both parties A and B accept all four policies, party C does not accept policy p 4 , and D does not accept policy p 3 . Hence, we have
The set of all feasible governments is then equal to
Moreover, using the notation from Section 2, we have which means that either B or C will be asked by the chairman to adjust its preferences. We check which party will be appointed as party i Hence, since |Y * * | = 2 > 1, we will apply to this example the procedure introduced in Section 3. Taking into account the parties's preferences mentioned in the beginning of this example, we have the following Let us see what the outcome would be under the other procedures discussed in Appendix A. Suppose that the supervisor appoints the strongest party, i.e., party A to choose the government. Hence, if we apply the quick procedure, we get y (1) = y 3 .
If we introduce negotiations, then party A proposes government y 3 , and hence, parties B and C have to react. Party B says 'yes', since it prefers y 3 to y 4 , and also party C agrees, since y 3 is the only one government it belongs to. Hence, we also get y (2) = y 3 .
Next, we apply the procedure of total gains. Hence, the procedure based on total gain yields
Note that this method does not have to represent the preferences of the majority of parties from DM * * , since party D is the only one which prefers y 4 to y 3 .
